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Preempting Justice through Binding Arbitration of Future
Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary
Consumer?
by Michael Z. Green The rebellion comes when the injustice is perceived .... The biggest
mistake rulers can make in this country, whether they have robes ...
money or executive suites, is to think that these injustices are not
being registered in the minds of people.
Ralph Nader'
Michael Green received his B.S. from the
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M.B.A. from the California Lutheran
University, and his M.S. & J.D. cum laude,
from the Loyola University Chicago. Mr.
Green Is an associate with the law firm
Brown, Todd & Heyburn in Louisville,
Kentucky. The opinions expressed in this
Article are solely the Author's and do not
express the opinions of Brown, Todd &
Heyburn or contain any legal advice.
I. INTRODUCTION
As early as 1933, Judge Learned
Hand, in James Baird Co. v. Gimbel
Bros.,' noted that "in commercial trans-
actions it does not in the end promote
justice to seek strained interpretations
in aid of those who do not protect
themselves." Although written sixty
years ago and referring to the legal
standards applicable in the enforce-
ment of a commercial contract between
merchants of equal bargaining power,
these words still ring loud and true
today. Such deferential standards are
necessary to ensure that the power and
freedom to contract remains a viable
and legally enforceable mechanism for
allocating risks in commercial transac-
tions.3
However, Judge Hand also recog-
nized that there were certain individual
transactions where strict standards of
contract interpretation would not apply
or would be overcome.' When indi-
vidual consumers with little or no bar-
gaining power have not consented to
particular contractual terms, the use of
the courts and judicial interpretations
may be the only way to promote justice
and allow consumers to protect them-
selves. Unfortunately, the trend, as
established in recent United States Su-
preme Court decisions, is to apply the
deferential standards of enforcement
from commercial transactions to situa-
tions involving adhesion contracts5 be-
tween an individual consumer and a
business entity where equal bargaining
power is clearly lacking.
6
Perhaps the most pervasive example
of this trend has been the Supreme
When individual consumers
with little or no bargaining
power have not consented
to particular contractual
terms, the use of the courts
and judicial interpretations
may be the only way to
promote justice and allow
consumers to protect
themselves.
Court's zealous enforcement of arbi-
tration 7 clauses under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("FAA").8 The increased
use of arbitration, like many other
forms of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"), has become a preferred
method for those who suggest that
there might be "a better way" for re-
solving litigation disputes. 9 Concerns
over this country's "litigation explo-
sion"' 0 may have fostered the growth of
ADR; many foes of the litigation pro-
cess are enrolling in the ADR move-
ment." The proponents of ADR sug-
gest that arbitration is a fast, effective
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means for resolving disputes without
the delays and exorbitant costs of liti-
gation. 2 Because of these purported
benefits, several jurists, scholars, and
practitioners are joining the ADR
ranks.'3 As a result, many new firms
and businesses are surfacing to take
advantage of the big money involved in
ADR services.14
Section II of the Article defines the
problem with adhesion agreements to
arbitrate future consumer disputes.
Section III of the Article provides a
framework for analyzing these adhe-
sion agreements and suggests appropri-
ate responses to correct current prob-
lems in this area. Finally, this Article
concludes that requiring knowing and
voluntary consent to an arbitration
clause is the only just method that gives
both consumers and merchants a clear
choice in determining the appropriate
forum for resolving their disputes.
II. THE DILEMMA: AGREEMENTS
TO ARBITRATE FUTURE
CONSUMER DISPUTES
When a business insists on an agree-
ment to arbitrate any future dispute that
may arise in a consumer transaction, it
creates a difficult dilemma for an indi-
vidual consumer. The commercial
entity requires the consumer to sign the
arbitration agreement as a condition of
receiving the consumer goods. As a
result, the consumer has a weakened
bargaining position. Many times the
consumer will not appreciate the rami-
fications of the arbitration clause and
will not have any option to bargain
over the terms even if he understands
the clause. Therefore, the consumer
must adhere to the agreement or lose
the possibility of receiving the con-
sumer goods or services from that mer-
chant. By signing an adhesion agree-
ment, the consumer assumes the risk
that the future dispute will not arise.
Once the dispute does arise, however,
the consumer has lost the option of
resolving the dispute through ajudicial
forum or any other forum aside from
the arbitral forum.
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A. The FAA Clearly Supports
Enforcement of Adhesion
Contracts
When signing an adhesion agree-
ment, the consumer may either know
that the clause exists but not voluntarily
Once a consumer
has manifested
assent by signing
the agreement or
some other
conduct, courts
will hastily
enforce the
arbitration clause
under the FAA.
assent to it or may voluntarily assent to
the clause without knowing the clause's
effect. In some instances, a consumer
may neither know of the clause nor
have voluntarily assented to it. There
will also be situations, however, where
a consumer is sophisticated enough to
know the potential effect of the clause
and still voluntarily agree to take that
risk.
The circumstances of the situation
should determine whether the parties
did or did not freely contract to waive
their substantive rights and agree to
have any future disputes resolved by
arbitration. Unfortunately, once a con-
sumer has manifested assent by signing
the agreement or some other conduct
(even though that was not the intention
as evidenced by the totality of the
circumstances), courts will hastily en-
force the arbitration clause under the
FAA.I
1. Mere Adhesion Contracts are
not per se Unenforceable
The Supreme Court has determined
that adhesion contracts under the FAA
should be treated no differently than
traditional contracts. 6 Therefore, tra-
ditional state contract doctrines rather
than aperse rule against enforceability
are the appropriate means for address-
ing the problem of adhesion contracts.
7
Nevertheless, the courts continue to
hold that state law adhesion contract
principles may not be invoked to bar
the arbitration of disputes under the
FAA." Furthermore, merchants may
try to avoid the adhesion issue by pro-
viding some economic consideration to
the consumer for agreeing to arbitrate
all future disputes. 9
It is doubtful that a typical merchant
would provide some form of separate
consideration because this detracts from
the value of standard form agreements
if an individual party is able to negoti-
ate individual consideration for the
arbitration clause. Still, if the mer-
chant made the consumer aware of the
arbitration clause and charged a uni-
form price for agreeing to include the
arbitration clause, the merchant prob-
ably will have circumvented the adhe-
sion agreement argument.
2. The Duty to Read Versus
Knowing and Voluntary
Consent
There is a fundamental clash of
policies in most cases involving stan-
dard form adhesion agreements. Courts
must balance the policy favoring the
economic freedom of contract and le-
gal enforcement of signed agreements
with the policy of not holding indi-
viduals or parties liable for terms in an
agreement to which the parties actually
never assented.
The consistent requirement of the
law is that a party has a duty to read
everything that has been assented to by
that party's signature. 2 Traditionally,
courts have rigidly enforced a party's
duty to read the terms of an agreement
before signing it.2' After signing the
agreement, the party is held strictly
accountable for all terms in the contract
whether or not the terms were read and
understood.2 However, one must ques-
tion whether the true intent of the
parties really has been met in an adhe-
sion agreement despite the court's de-
termination to enforce these agreements
under the freedom of contract policy.
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Unequal bargaining positions suggest
an unfairness in the arrangement that
should be questioned rather than con-
doned.23
A consumer who lacks bargaining
power has no real choice.' The imbal-
ance of power and financial resources
between a merchant and a consumer
forces the use of arbitration which is "at
odds with a conception of justice that
seeks to make the wealth of the parties
irrelevant."25 Too many times courts
summarily refer a dispute to arbitra-
tion. Some commentators have sug-
gested that these court referrals, under
the guise of supporting ADR, are merely
an effort to clear crowded dockets with-
out addressing the coercive nature of
the agreement or the public concerns
involved.26
B. The FAA Can Preempt State
Arbitration and Consumer
Protection Laws that Effectively
Limit Arbitration
Any state that develops a consumer
protection law, arbitration law, or any
other law27 that limits the ability of
commercial merchants to create arbi-
tration contracts with consumers will
be faced with federal preemption prob-
lems under the FAA.28 Although the
FAA has no express preemption provi-
sion and was not intended by Congress
to occupy the entire field of arbitration,
a state arbitration law cannot "stand
... as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress" in enacting
the FAA.29 At one point, many litigators
thought that individual state arbitration
laws would apply more frequently than
the FAA if choice of state law clauses
were also used, but it has not worked
out that way.30
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of
America,3 the Court addressed one of
the limitations of the FAA; the transac-
tion must involve interstate commerce
before the FAA applies.32 Because the
FAA does not provide an independent
basis for federal jurisdiction, most fed-
eral courts are not in a position to
address a consumer dispute involving
an arbitration clause.33 Nevertheless, if
the dispute involves a sum that is sig-
nificant enough to obtain federal court
jurisdiction between parties from dif-
ferent states or involves some other
Unequal bargaining
positions suggest
an unfairness in the
arrangement that
should be
questioned rather
than condoned
federal question, then a dispute involv-
ing interstate commerce most likely
has occurred. This may explain why
federal courts regularly provide a mere
cursory analysis or no analysis of the
interstate commerce issues before ap-
plying the FAA to the agreement in-
volved.34 If the contract involved
amounts large enough to get into fed-
eral court between two parties who are
at least domiciled in different states at
the time the suit is filed, this may
suggest that interstate commerce is in-
volved.3" If the plaintiff is seeking
vindication through some federal stat-
ute, then the commerce power is more
than likely the basis for that statute.
Accordingly, most issues regarding
the scope of the FAA are determined by
state courts. If the FAA does apply to
the transaction, the state court must
enforce the arbitration agreement re-
gardless of any state laws that might
make the agreement invalid. Because
the commerce clause is broadly ap-
plied, most agreements will be subject
to the FAA.36 One commentator has
suggested that "in light of the strong
pro-federal attitude in the Supreme
Court and the lower courts on matters
relating to the scope of the Federal
Arbitration Act, it appears likely that a
court would conclude that even an
intrastate . . . contract" is covered by
the FAA.37 There will be some situa-
tions, however, which are purely local
and the FAA will not apply. 38
The case of Preston v. Kruezer39 is
illustrative of the circumstances where
a state's efforts to protect its consumers
may be preempted by the FAA. In this
case, the plaintiff was a widow with
two dependent children who had only a
modest income from periodic work as
a grocery and drug store checker. 4' The
plaintiff had little education or invest-
ment knowledge but she had received
approximately $22,000 and sought in-
vestment advice from the defendant, a
stock broker, and manager of an invest-
ment firm.4 The court determined that
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and De-
ceptive Business Practices Act ("Con-
sumer Act")4 2 applied to the plaintiff's
allegations of unfair and deceptive prac-
tices by the defendant in the sale of
securities to her for investment. 43
The court then determined, how-
ever, that the Consumer Act claim had
to be dismissed and conducted under
arbitration because the plaintiff had
signed a General Account Agreement
providing that "[i]f any controversy
arises ... it shall be settled by arbitra-
tion.""' The court further determined
that the FAA was designed to alleviate
traditional judicial hostility toward ar-
bitration and establish a federal policy
favoring arbitration. 45 The court deter-
mined that Supreme Court cases inter-
preting the FAA' required the district
court to compel arbitration of all state
The FAA was
designed to
alleviate traditional
judicial hostility
toward arbitration
and establish a
federal policy
favoring
arbitration.
claims even if it became necessary to
maintain separate proceedings in dif-
ferent forums. 7
The court then addressed the
plaintiff's claims that the arbitration
114 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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clause in the General Account Agree-
ment was "an unenforceable contract
of adhesion."48 The court found that if
this were true,. then the plaintiff's state
law claims, including the Consumer
Act claim, could not be arbitrated. 49
The court disregarded the plaintiff's
argument, determining that although
the contract was an adhesion contract,
the "mere fact that one party to a
contract enjoyed little relative bargain-
ing strength... cannot alone render a
contractual provision unenforceable.""
It is somewhat astonishing that the
present Supreme Court, in interpreting
the FAA, has been so decisive in its
efforts to supersede and preempt state
laws. The application of the Tenth
Amendment to prevent congressional
overreaching and encroachment upon
the States is somewhat limited." A
1991 case, Gregory v. Ashcroft,52 sug-
gests that federalism concepts are not
dead. The Supreme Court recognized
that states can prevent Congressional
interference by utilizing the political
process to pressure Congress into lim-
iting the coverage of a federal statute.
The Court developed a "plain state-
ment" rule that requires Congress to
state plainly that it intends to override
the normal constitutional balance be-
tween the two sovereigns so that it is
"'unmistakably clear"' in the legisla-
tion.53 Despite such strong statements
on behalf of federalism, the Supreme
Court's desire to foster arbitration in
almost any circumstance has limited
exceedingly the rights of states to set
their own policy regarding the en-
forcement of contracts within their
boundaries.
C. Consumer Arbitration: Adhesion
Agreements of the Future
Arbitration programs for consumer
disputes have been available to busi-
nesses for years.54 Probably the indus-
try that has most utilized arbitration for
resolving consumer disputes has been
the automobile industry. 5  With the
invocation of many "lemon laws," the
availability of ADR systems grew.5 6
These systems have gradually improved
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the ability of a consumer to have a
dispute quickly and effectively re-
solved. However, these systems are set
up through the public process required
by legal and statutory mandates and
involve traditional dispute resolution
organizations such as the Better Busi-
ness Bureau and the American Arbitra-
tion Association ("AAA"). These pro-
grams foster voluntary involvement,
encouraging consumer usage through
education and awareness while not at-
tempting to coerce individual consum-
ers into the program through signed
adhesion agreements.
Arguments in favor of
adhesion agreements
are not as strong when
consumers do not
understand the
ramifications of the
arbitration clause and
there is effectively no
place "across the
street" where
consumers can go to
retain their statutory
and litigation rights.
Unfortunately, the enforcement of
adhesion agreements to arbitrate con-
sumer securities disputes under the FAA
has led to the expansion of adhesive
arbitration agreements to other con-
sumer areas. Now a homeowner who
purchases a warranty contract may soon
find that the resolution of any disputes
must be by binding arbitration because
the contract referred to the rules of the
AAA." Other examples of consumer
adhesion agreements to arbitrate are
emerging. One recent example in-
volves the consumer banking industry
and specifically the Bank of America.
The banking field often has applied
the general principle that assent to all
terms is implied by a person's signature
and the corresponding duty to read the
contract. 8 Bank of America, a San
Francisco-based bank and the nation's
second largest, has recently announced
that it will provide binding arbitration
in disputes with its customers over
deposit and credit card accounts. 9 Bank
of America may be the first major
money-center institution to include
binding arbitration in its retail cus-
tomer accounts. 6° Although the prac-
tice of using binding arbitration is com-
monplace for medical practitioners,
construction companies, and stock bro-
kers, the practice is relatively new for
banks. 61
Some consumer lawyers argued that
Bank of America's agreements would
not be binding because they lack the
consumers' assent and provide classic
examples of illegal adhesion contracts
that coerce consumers into signing away
legal rights to their detriment. 61 Bank
of Americaresponded through Winslow
Christian, senior vice president and
director of litigation, who said:
It is an adhesion contract, it
clearly is, but an adhesion con-
tract is not voidable unless it is
[un]fair .... [A] person has
signed a document saying the
terms of the contract can be
amended at any time. The
terms are then amended it in
accordance with that clause
and they are notified of the
change, and if they don't like
it they can go across the
street.63
Arguments in favor of adhesion
agreements are not as strong when
consumers do not understand the rami-
fications of the arbitration clause and
there is effectively no place "across the
street" where consumers can go to re-
tain their statutory and litigation rights.
Wells Fargo Bank, California's second
largest bank, has already followed Bank
of America's lead by instituting a man-
datory ADR program for its custom-
ers.64 Other banks are expected to
follow their lead. A court challenge
will most likely ensue. It is uncertain
whether a California court would find
these arbitration clauses enforceable
agreements to be bound by the bank's
rules and regulations or merely "traps
for the unwary. '"65
Recently, at least one California
lawyer"has become permanently jaun-
diced about the wonders of alternative
dispute resolution" for resolving an
insurance consumer's dispute and is
"disturbed about the idea of touting
ADR as the savior of mankind."' Even
one of the leading catalysts in increas-
ing the use of arbitration, former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, Warren
Burger, stated that: "I do not suggest in
any sense that arbitration can displace
the courts ... [but] arbitration should
be an alternative that will complement
the judicial systems [because t]here
will always be conflicts which cannot
be settled except by the judicial pro-
cess."
67
The problem is that the ADR move-
ment has become so pervasive that
almost nothing can stop it. 68 Advocates
have singled out ADR as the "panacea"
for resolving disputes without the de-
lays and financial burdens of litiga-
tion.69 Such altruistic aims are difficult
to attack from a policy or political
viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has been
argued that ADR creates a two-tiered
system of justice: one system for the
"haves" and another system of lower
quality for the "have-nots. ' '7° It also
has been argued that ADR merely fo-
cuses on improved procedural steps
while failing to offer the quality pro-
tection that substantive law affords in-
dividuals. 71
1i1. RESOLVING THE DILEMMA:
LEVELING THE PLAYING
FIELD
In general, fostering the use of arbi-
tration or any other method for the
quick resolution of disputes does not
merit criticism or attack, in itself. The
attack or criticism should focus on the
coercion that occurs through the en-
forcement of adhesion agreements that
fail to provide a meaningful choice of
arbitral forum. Once a dispute arises
between parties of unequal bargaining
power, the threat of litigation provides
a level playing field to ensure that a
decision to settle, arbitrate, litigate, or
use any other dispute resolution method
is clearly decided by the meaningful
choice and agreement of both parties.
A. Equal Bargaining Power is the
Hallmark of the FAA
The policy of preferring arbitration
under the FAA developed from a desire
to remove judicial scrutiny of agree-
ments to arbitrate made by two com-
mercial entities or merchants.72 The
Senate Committee Hearings to deter-
Courts have only
given lip-service to
the recognition that
"arbitration
remains a dispute
resolution
mechanism which
is not imposed
absent both
parties'consent."
mine the purpose of the FAA found
that the bill which became the FAA was
"intended [to] be ... purely an act to
give the merchants the right or privi-
lege of sitting down and agreeing with
each other as to what their damages are,
if they want to do it ....
Before the enactment of the FAA,
courts had routinely declared agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes unen-
forceable because they improperly
ousted the court's jurisdiction. 4 The
FAA allowed merchants to agree that
arbitration would be a "substitute" for
litigation with limited judicial inter-
vention.75 The policy of the FAA
requires minimal concern over bar-
gaining power when two merchants are
involved. Bargaining power between
two commercial merchants is estab-
lished from the economic resources of
the two entities and the ability to go
elsewhere if a deal is not possible.
In its recent opinions addressing the
FAA, the Supreme Court has glossed
over the FAA's clear intention to en-
force arbitration agreements between
merchants of equal bargaining power.76
Unfortunately, the only recent Supreme
Court opinions that provide a thorough
analysis of the legislative history and
purpose of the FAA, as it pertains to
bargaining power, are the dissenting
opinions.7 7 According to Justice
Stevens' analysis of the legislative his-
tory in his dissenting opinion in Gilmer,
the FAA was intended to remove judi-
cial animosity toward commercial
agreements to arbitrate damage claims
made between two business entities or
merchants, not between an employer
and an employee.7 1 Justice Stevens
added some teeth to the inequality of
bargaining argument by referring to
the legislative history of the FAA:
When the FAA was passed in
1925, I doubt that any legisla-
tor who voted for it expected
it to apply to... form con-
tracts between parties of un-
equal bargaining power ....
[T]he Court has...put to one
side any concern about the
inequality of bargaining power
between an entire industry, on
the one hand, and an indi-
vidual customer ...on the
other.
79
Given the underlying assumptions
of equal bargaining power that dictated
the policy of preferring arbitration in
commercial disputes, it is disturbing
that courts blindly approve arbitration
agreements under the FAA where there
is clear evidence of a lack of bargaining
power. Unfortunately, courts have
only given lip-service to the recogni-
tion that "arbitration remains a dispute
resolution mechanism which is not
imposed absent both parties' consent."0
Lack of bargaining power between the
individual consumer and the business
entity or merchant requires a new analy-
sis.
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B. Agreements to Arbitrate Future
Consumer Disputes Should Be
Presumed Unenforceable Under
the FAA
One commentator has argued that an
agreement to arbitrate future disputes
should not be upheld.8 These agree-
ments can create situations where indi-
viduals lose their day in court and are
forced to arbitrate a dispute that may
have been a subject for legitimate liti-
gation. However, if an agreement is
made after the event upon which the
claim is based and the individual com-
pletes a "voluntary and knowing"
waiver, this form of a post-event waiver
or agreement to arbitrate should cer-
tainly be upheld.8 2
An agreement to arbitrate "all future
disputes" should not be enforced in
situations where the issue has been
addressed by state statute unless there is
a clear desire by both parties to waive
their statutory rights.83 This position is
supported by the argument that the
formation of a statute was required
because these issues could not necessar-
ily be resolved by contract in the pri-
vate sectora If an agreement to arbi-
trate future disputes is an adhesion
contract where the consumer has little,
if any, bargaining power, enforcement
allows the private entity to coercively
limit certain substantive rights that the
state legislature sought to protect.
If both parties to an arbitration agree-
ment truly have bargaining power, they
can freely negotiate terms, seek legal
advice, and specify how their legal
rights will be enforced if a dispute
occurs. Both sides freely give up cer-
tain rights in exchange for the certainty
of the terms within their agreement.
However, a large business or even an
entire industry can circumvent a state's
legislative and statutory process by es-
tablishing standard form terms limit-
ing the substantive rights of individuals
without any knowing and voluntary
agreement to those terms by the indi-
vidual. If a whole industry, e.g., the
banking industry in California, adopts
these terms in standard forms, it has
become a quasi-legislature and has
changed the substantive rights normally
guaranteed to individuals by state law.
Enforcement of adhesion agreements
under the FAA when a state legislature
has determined that the adhesive nature
of the agreement makes them unen-
forceable, goes too far in the name of
court reform and litigation alterna-
tives. The roles of the state legislative
system, the legal system, and the bench
are being usurped by private agree-
ments to arbitrate disputes. The public
concerns that led to the enactment of a
statute and the creation of substantive
rights are being subsumed by a mental-
ity that suggests arbitration or any al-
ternative to litigation be employed at
all costs. 5
Therefore, if a private adhesion
agreement lacks bargaining, involves
coercion of individuals, and circum-
vents the judicial or statutory process,
it should be presumed unenforceable.86
The FAA was only enacted to protect
merchants of equal bargaining power
who found that they could not enforce
their agreements to arbitrate.8 7 Although
the FAA was intended to remove the
courts' antiquated notions that con-
tracts should not be able to effect an
"ouster" of a court's jurisdiction, it was
never intended to allow businesses or
whole industries to evade the public
concerns addressed by a state's statute
or any other legislative action. Once a
clear dispute has arisen or equal bar-
gaining exists, only then can the parties
knowingly and voluntarily agree on
whether they will settle, arbitrate, or
litigate the dispute.
1. Changing Judicial
Interpretation and
Analysis
In adhesion agreements, concerns of
unequal bargaining power are present
whether the contract involves an indi-
vidual consumer or an individual em-
ployee.88 Older employees are one of
the most likely groups to be coerced
into an adhesion agreement which re-
quires the arbitration of future dis-
putes.89 A decision by the Third Cir-
cuit, Coventry v. United States Steel
Corp.,90 exemplifies the concern of
unequal bargaining where individual
employees are asked to waive age dis-
crimination rights. The analysis es-
poused in this case suggests a model for
application to consumer disputes.
This analysis requires a court to go
beyond the traditional validity of con-
tract analysis and look at "the totality
of the circumstances" in determining
whether a party's actions were know-
ing and voluntary. 9' By applying this
analysis in his writing for the majority,
Judge Higginbotham noted that an older
employee is faced with a "Hobson's
choice" or "take it or leave it" situation
when asked to sign an agreement to
waive age discrimination claims.' This
dilemma for the older employee sup-
ported a finding that the decision to
sign such an agreement "was not know-
ingly and willfully made" where the
company had placed "unfair economic
pressure" upon the individual employee
to sign the agreement.93
This analysis of the totality of the
circumstances in age discrimination
waivers should be applied by courts as
the federal common law under the
FAA. The courts should remove the
traditional and formalistic adhesion
contract analysis from these issues and
presume that these agreements are un-
enforceable until the drafter of the
contract proves that the agreement is
enforceable. Drafters of adhesion
agreements to arbitrate could rebut the
presumption by showing that the
consumer's actions in signing the agree-
ment were knowing and voluntary un-
der the totality of the circumstances.
This method does not create a per se
rule invalidating all agreements to ar-
bitrate future disputes but rather cre-
ates a framework of fairness and flex-
ibility for courts analyzing such agree-
ments under the FAA. Finally, the
shifting of the burdens and presump-
tions to the drafter assures that true
consumer choice and fairness will pre-
vail and heal the wounds arising from
perceived injustices associated with the
coercion attendant to adhesion con-
tracts.
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2. Legislative Response
Despite the recent and drastic
changes in the FAA's scope from what
Congress intended in 1925, it is unclear
whether today's Congress agrees with
this presently expanded scope. Con-
gress has endorsed the use of ADR in
recent legislation94 but has not sug-
gested the coercive use of ADR that the
Supreme Court has endorsed. Because
the real expansion and overreaching in
this instance has not developed through
congressional action but through judi-
cial interpretation, Congress can over-
rule and modify the Supreme Court's
statutory interpretations of the FAA. 95
Certainly, Congress has acted before in
response to judicial decisions that im-
paired state and local interests.95
Typically, advocacy or interest
groups are unsuccessful in lobbying
Congress to overturn Supreme Court
decisions that solely hurt consumer
interests.96 Therefore, a coalition with
other interest groups is essential to
success. The greatest hope for con-
sumer interest groups seeking a con-
gressional override of the Supreme
Court's endorsement of coerced arbi-
tration is for States and Local Govern-
ments to join them in their fight. 97
Also, the National Association of At-
torneys General might be willing to
enter the debate if their states' con-
sumer protection laws are being pre-
empted by the FAA.98 Certainly, con-
sumer interest groups should unite with
as many interests as possible in lobby-
ing Congress for reforms to the FAA.
With a strong showing, these groups
could get Congress to amend the FAA
so that it would be inapplicable to
adhesion contracts and would not pre-
empt state laws protecting potentially
weaker parties involved in an adhesion
agreement.
Recent developments in the law of
age discrimination, pertaining to indi-
vidual employee contracts, suggest an
appropriate model for legislative re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's present
interpretation of the FAA. The Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act
("OWBPA") 99 establishes procedures
for ensuring that an individual em-
ployee knowingly and voluntarily
waives claims under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act("ADEA,,).100
The OWBPA amended ADEA and
The shifting of the
burdens and
presumptions to the
drafter assures that true
consumer choice and
fairness will prevail and
heal the wounds arising
from perceived
injustices associated
with the coercion
attendant to adhesion
contracts.
created minimum standards for deter-
mining the validity of waivers of ADEA
claims that are not supervised by the
courts. 10 1 The OWBPA prevents an
employer from foisting an arbitration
agreement upon an employee without
the employee fully understanding the
ramifications of giving up the right to
bring a statutory discrimination claim
in court.
Under the OWBPA, an employee
can only waive existing "rights orclaims"
under the ADEA, and therefore a waiver
of future claims would be unenforce-
able."° At least one commentator has
suggested, however, that employers may
get around this requirement by arguing
that an arbitration agreement is merely
a procedural forum selection clause
that does not waive a future substantive
right or a future claim.'0 3 The argu-
ment is that the selection of a forum is
a vested procedural right that accrues at
the time the contractual relationship
begins and does not depend upon the
occurrence of future events."° If arbi-
tration is merely another forum that
does not affect the substantive rights of
an individual, this argument may sur-
vive the OWBPA requirements.
Nevertheless, the measures in the
OWBPA could easily be amended to
the FAA. This would clearly establish
that an arbitration agreement, whether
it is considered a substantive or a pro-
cedural device, could only be enforced
if the parties had knowingly and volun-
tarily agreed to it. Amending the
OWBPA procedures to the FAA would
ensure, by looking beyond just the
signing of the agreement, that all par-
ties had agreed to have the dispute
resolved through arbitration. This
would provide the justice desired by
both consumers and merchants in re-
solving their disputes under arbitration
agreements.
All those who believe that arbitra-
tion and ADR will save humankind
from its litigious nature should be wary
about its potential for abuse. History
has shown that even good ideas can go
too far. If the application of arbitration
is abused, it could foster a backlash,
with consumers and other groups seek-
ing the type of statutory protection and
amendment to the FAA as suggested in
this Article.105 Even advocates of the
ADR movement should be critical of
certain businesses or industries that
abuse arbitration and coerce consumers
to agree to it. If ADR is truly a better
way, the parties will want to enter into
it without the economic coercion in-
herent in adhesion contracts.
In past situations where the Su-
preme Court has significantly limited
the rights of individuals through statu-
tory interpretation of federal law, pub-
lic and political pressure has forced
Congress to respond and correct the
Court's actions. These congressional
responses may extend far beyond what
would have happened if the Court had
not tinkered with the statute at all.
Businesses, merchants, and corpora-
tions should realize that by coercing
consumers and other individuals with
little bargaining power into using arbi-
tration, they are providing the legisla-
ture with an open invitation to respond
and amend the FAA. That legislative
response may force even more restric-
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tions on arbitration than were present
before the Court's expansion of the
FAA."° The focus should shift from
coercing the forum to giving the con-
sumer and business a choice between
litigation and binding arbitration once
a dispute arises.
C. True Justice Will Provide
Consumers with a Choice
When a person is coerced into an
action, the lack of choice creates a
perception of injustice. The assump-
tion is that a business would not be
trying to coerce consumers into certain
actions unless it was beneficial to the
business and probably harmful to the
consumer. Whether this assumption is
justified does not matter if human na-
ture provides the impetus for the as-
sumption. After all, "we must remem-
ber that the overarching goal of alter-
native dispute resolution is to provide
equal justice to all.""0 7 A distinguished
Supreme Court Justice once said that
"the governing principle of a humane
society and a good legal system... [is
to] recognize the worth and importance
of every person ... [and] be perceived
by all the people as providing equal
justice."'' 8 Where a party is coerced
into an adhesion agreement to arbitrate
future disputes and the courts enforce
that agreement quickly and without
hesitation, it follows that the party will
interpret these events as unfair.
A clear and unmistakable waiver
with knowing and voluntary consent is
the usual requirement before a court
will enforce the waiver of a substantive
right."9 Certainly, it will be argued
that an arbitration clause does not af-
fect the substantive rights of a party
because those rights can still be vindi-
cated in the arbitral forum." 0 This
argument disregards the substantive
rights and public concerns that litiga-
tion options and statutory enforcement
mechanisms tend to ameliorate."'
Despite this argument, the Supreme
Court has "long recognized that 'the
choice of forum inevitably affects the
scope of the substantive right to be
vindicated.""' 2
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The protection of consumers, or any
other individuals, who have signed a
contract but have not assented to an
arbitral forum is more than a visceral
concern. Contracts are based on the
assent of the parties, and deference is
given to arbitration agreements due to
the strong preference for resolving dis-
putes by the parties' clearly chosen
method. Deference to an arbitration
clause is desirable for courts wanting to
effectuate the intent of the parties.
However, standard form agreements
with forum selection clauses (includ-
ing arbitration clauses) should not be
enforceable per se when no true assent
to the arbitral forum was ever given.
Deferential enforcement of arbitra-
tion clauses in adhesion contracts ef-
The assumption is
that a business
would not be trying
to coerce
consumers into
certain actions
unless it was
beneficial to the
business and
probably harmful to
the consumer.
fectuates the clear intent of only one of
the parties, the merchant and drafter of
the arbitration clause. By looking at
the totality of the circumstances, the
court can determine effectively whether
the individual knowingly and volun-
tarily agreed to waive his substantive
rights. These circumstances include
the individual's education and experi-
ence, his role in deciding the inclusion
or exclusion of the arbitration clause,
the clarity of the terms in the arbitra-
tion clause, whether the individual used
legal representation in negotiating the
agreement, and whether there was valid
consideration given for the release of
the right to seek a judicial forum." 3
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has not endorsed the
pursuit of litigation over arbitration
but has focused on giving a consumer
and a business entity, as parties to a
consumer transaction, achoice between
the two alternatives once a dispute
arises. The overwhelming desire by
the courts and other commentators to
use ADR systems, including arbitra-
tion, may be a noble and decent ges-
ture. As this Article has explained,
however, this worthy end of resolving
disputes through quick and inexpen-
sive arbitration should not be swal-
lowed up by the means in which indi-
vidual consumer disputes end up in
arbitration.
Agreements to arbitrate future con-
sumer disputes should not be enforce-
able when they consist of adhesion
contracts lacking voluntary consent or
any effective choice by the consumer.
This is a policy argument and tends to
go against the grain of recent Supreme
Court precedent. Nevertheless, there is
strong support for this viewpoint as
evidenced by various state laws that
have attempted to limit the use of
arbitration and waiver of the judicial
forum for certain disputes. The FAA
should not be allowed to preempt state
efforts at delivering justice to those
individuals who, without these laws,
would not be in a position to protect
themselves. Either the courts should
change their analysis to recognize the
totality of the circumstances or Con-
gress should amend the FAA to address
these concerns.
Finally, consumer arbitration is a
strong and effective dispute resolution
tool if both sides knowingly and volun-
tarily agree to it after a dispute has
arisen or when equal bargaining over
terms is present. If the knowing and
voluntary use of ADR provides con-
sumers and businesses with quicker and
less expensive methods for resolving
disputes, true justice will have been
achieved. Justice does not follow from
a situation where consumers are forced
to adhere to an arbitral forum and
process that they would not have cho-
Lea Arile
sen once the dispute arose. A coerced
forum fosters the perception, which
may be reality in some instances, that
consumers are being treated unfairly.
Even those who actively promote the
use of ADR may one day see the nega-
tive consequences of the coercion,
through an exploitation of the goals
and purposes of the ADR movement,
of individuals in consumer transac-
tions. o-
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